Stop SBIR Mills

Reform the program to prioritize American ingenuity: align topics to real programs, fund transition, and end perpetual mills.

View the 5 fixes

What is SBIR?

The Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program was established by Congress in 1982 to strengthen the role of innovative small businesses in federally funded research and development. The program requires federal agencies with large R&D budgets to set aside a portion of their funding specifically for small businesses to conduct innovative research that has commercial potential.

Original Intent: SBIR was designed to:

The program has been remarkably successful in many ways, funding breakthrough innovations in defense, healthcare, energy, and other critical sectors while helping thousands of small businesses grow and create jobs.

Enter SBIR Mills

While SBIR has been remarkably successful in funding breakthrough innovations across defense, healthcare, energy, and other critical sectors, a concerning pattern has emerged. “SBIR mills” are firms that have mastered the art of winning SBIR awards but have largely failed to deliver on the program’s core promise of commercialization and market impact.

What SBIR Mills Do:

The result is a system where taxpayer dollars fund an endless cycle of research without the breakthrough products and economic growth that SBIR was designed to produce.

Why This Threatens U.S. Innovation Leadership

The SBIR mills phenomenon creates a cascading series of problems that undermine America’s technological edge and economic competitiveness. Here’s why this pattern is so damaging:

The cumulative effect is a innovation ecosystem where the same players win repeatedly, while the next generation of breakthrough technologies struggles to get off the ground. This threatens America’s long-term technological dominance and economic prosperity.

How Mills Block New Market Entrants

The SBIR mills phenomenon creates formidable barriers that prevent innovative startups from entering and competing in critical technology markets. SBIR was designed to be the U.S. government’s “front door” - a running start program where small businesses could get their foot in the door of federal contracting. But this door is now slammed shut by SBIR mills, leaving small businesses with no good entry point except to grovel at the feet of large prime contractors, where pass-through costs get passed to the customer. Here’s how this systemic issue blocks the next generation of American innovators:

The result is a self-perpetuating system where the same firms win repeatedly, while potentially transformative technologies from new entrants never get the chance to prove themselves. This reduces competition, stifles diversity of thought, and limits America's access to the most innovative solutions in defense, healthcare, energy, and other critical sectors.

In defense markets specifically, this pattern is particularly concerning because it limits the Department of Defense's access to disruptive innovations that could provide asymmetric advantages against adversaries. When mills dominate, the military gets incremental improvements rather than revolutionary capabilities.

How to Correctly Align and Fix the SBIR Program

1) Align every SBIR topic to a real program with a path to insertion

Why: Transition stalls and milling thrives when money is detached from real acquisition/S&T programs. Without a path, tech has low priority in program offices, wasting funds on projects unlikely to transition. Bad actors adapt and optimize for awards over adoption.

Rebuttal: “This slows timelines and burdens TPOCs/program offices.”
Response: Blue-sky belongs at DARPA, and DARPA SBIRs often act as early leverage for real programs. Cash alignment is a forcing function: if internal communication cannot support transition, we should not fund tech destined to die for lack of coordination.

2) Require a 10% programmed transition fund in aligned programs

Why: The “valley of death” is a budget timing gap. Solve it by reserving transition dollars on the program side that can only be used to adopt SBIR outputs. Unused funds are lost, creating strong incentives. With topics aligned, this becomes a predictable bridge across the valley and raises expected transition rates toward 10%.

Rebuttal: “We already tie up 2.5% for SBIR; why reserve 10% more?”
Response: Congress can authorize/appropriate the wedge or sequester existing lines. This is a policy choice that matches priorities to outcomes and will drive use of rapid contracting (e.g., P3) to deploy funds annually.

3) Disqualify companies that fail to maintain a 10% transition rate

Why: Accountability aligns incentives toward building and transitioning, not perpetual award‑seeking.

Rebuttal: “Some firms are simply better at transition.”
Response: With a programmatically aligned 10% path, persistent failure indicates misalignment. Disqualification is reasonable.

4) Disqualify TPOCs that fail to maintain a 10% transition rate

Why: Topic authors must write for adoption, not entertainment.

Rebuttal: “Some TPOCs are better at transition.”
Response: With a defined 10% path, recurring failure signals poor topic design or shepherding and should lead to removal from the role.

5) Cap total awards (company + subsidiaries) at $25M

Why: After $25M in SBIR seed, firms should be cash‑flowing with a self‑sustaining R&D pipeline. The taxpayer should not fund indefinite dependency.

Rebuttal: “What about firms that keep building new products via SBIR?”
Response: In private markets, $25M is ample to establish customers who fund development. If it is not, a closed market should not underwrite the absence of product‑market discipline.